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RIGGINS v. NEVADA
112 S.Ct. 1810 (1992)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
On November 22, 1987, David Riggins was arrested by Nevada
authorities for the murder of Paul Wade, who had died of multiple stab
wounds two days earlier. After being taken into custody, Riggins, who
had a history of psychiatric problems, reported to a physician in the Clark
County jail that he was having trouble sleeping because he heard voices
in his head. Riggins told the doctor that he had been treated in the past
with Mellaril, an antipsychotic drug. The doctor began to administer
Mellaril to Riggins, gradually increasing the dosage, until Riggins was
taking 800 milligrams a day, an unusually high dosage according to
expert testimony at the trial.
In a January 1988 competency hearing, two court appointed psy-
chiatrists concluded that Riggins was competent to stand trial while a
third found Riggins incompetent. In June, the defense moved for
suspension of the administration of the antipsychotic drugs, claiming that
Riggins woula - f-ejudiced if he could not present his true demeanor
and mental state to the jury. After an evidentiary hearing on the possible
effects of -'spending the administration of the drugs in July, the district
court denied T". -gins' motion without explaining its rationale. At trial,
Riggins offered an insanity defense and testified that voices in his head
told him that killing the victim would be an act of self defense. The jury
found Riggins guilty and sentenced him to death.
his appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court, Riggins claimed that the
continued forced administration of the antipsychotic drugs violated his
protected liberty interest in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, as construed in Washington v. Harper.1 He also
argued that the forced administration of the drugs interfered with his
Sixth Amendment fair trial rights by affecting his ability to assist in his
defense, as well as changing his demeanor, attitude, and appearance. The
Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Riggins' conviction and death sen-
tence, holding that expert testimony presented at the trial was sufficient
to inform thejury of the effect that the drugs mighthave onRiggins.2 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether Riggins' Sixth or
Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated.3
HOLDING
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded,4 holding that the
Nevada court had failed to provide Riggins the minimum due process
required by Washington v. Harper. Because the district court made no
findings as to whether continued administration of drugs was medically
appropriate, whether there were less intrusive alternatives, or whether
there was an overriding state interest in this case, the Court ruled that
there was "a strong possibility that Riggins' defense was impaired due to
1 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
2 Riggins v. State, 808 P.2d 535 (Nev. 1991).
3 Riggins included an additional Eighth Amendment claim which
the Court did not consider because he failed to raise it below and did not
address it in his petition to the Court.
4 Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S.Ct. 1810 (1992).
5 Id. at 1816.
6 494 U.S. 210. In Harper, a prison inmate challenged the forced
administration of drugs used to control his prison behavior. Although the
court recognized a liberty interest in avoiding forced administration of
drugs, the prisoner's claim failed, as he was considered a danger to
himself or others.
7 Id. at 229.
the administration of Mellaril," depriving him of his Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendment rights.5
APPLICATION/ANALYSIS IN VIRGINIA
The due process standard for assessing the forced administration of
drugs was defined in Washington v. Harper.6 In Harper, the Court held
that individuals have a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest which
protects them from the forced administration of drugs: "the forcible
injection into a nonconsenting person's body, represents a substantial
interference with the person's liberty. ' 7 Accordingly, in order to
continue administration of such drugs a trial court must apply the Harper
standard and make a finding as to whether: (1) the administration of drugs
is medically appropriate; (2) the defendant in an unmedicated state is a
danger to himself or others; or (3) less intrusive alternatives are not
available. If these findings are not made, and there is no overriding state
interest, the state may not order the continued administration of the drugs.
Because the district court in Riggins denied the motion to suspend
administration "without making any determination of the need for this
course or any findings about reasonable alternatives," the Court held that
Riggins' liberty interest may have been violated.8 This was especially
true in light of the "particularly severe" interference that administration
of antipsychotic medication causes. 9
In addition, the Court noted that the effect the drugs had on Riggins'
demeanormay have impaired his constitutionally protected trial rights.10
For example, it is impossible to determine from the record what effect the
drugs may have had on Riggins' ability to answer questions, to assist
counsel with his defense, and to confront the witnesses testifying against
him. Without evidence of the trial court's reasons for denying Riggins'
motion to stop the administration of the medication, and without evi-
dence of an overriding state interest, the Supreme Court could see no
justification for the possible strong prejudice to the defendant in this
case. I I
It should be noted that the holding in this case may be a relatively
narrow one. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, stressed that the
Court was not adopting, as the dissent charged, a standard of strict
scrutiny in cases where the State seeks to administer drugs involun-
tarily. 12 She also pointed out that the court was not deciding "whether
a competent defendant may refuse antipsychotic medication if cessation
would render him incompetent at trial."1 3 It is possible that if the district
court had made any of the required findings to justify the continued
administration of the drugs, a majority of the Court would have found that
Harper had been satisfied. At bottom, therefore, Riggins does not
directly address competency issues, 14 butrather is focused onprocedural
due process.
8 Riggins, 112 S.Ct. at 1815-1816 (emphasis in original).
9 Id. at 1814.
10 Id. at 1816.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 1815.
13 Id.
14 Justice Kennedy focused on the competency issue in his
concurring opinion. The volatile nature of these drugs and the myriad of
possible side effects led him to conclude: "[i]f the state cannot render the
defendant competent without involuntary medication, then it must resort
to civil commitment, if appropriate, unless the defendant becomes
competent through other means." Id. at 1820 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Although the Court did not adopt a standard of strict scrutiny for
forced administration of drugs, the state's burden to provide procedural
protections to the defendant remains high. In cases where competency
is a central issue, defense counsel should pursue all possible procedural
avenues. One of the most important of these tools for defense counsel is
requesting appointment of a mental health expert for indigent defendants
through Ake v. Oklahoma,15 and Virginia's mitigation expert statute.
16
Such an expert may be crucial in litigating whether there is a need for
forced medication to achieve competency and in establishing the drug's
potential adverse effects at trial, especially on the defendant's demeanor
and thought process.
17
An expert also may be particularly helpful inestablishing apotential
Eighth Amendment violation as a result of forced medication. Because
of procedural default, the Court did not address Riggins' Eighth Amend-
ment argument that administration of the drugs had affected his de-
meanor at trial and impaired his penalty phase defense. The argument,
however, may have a great deal of merit. In Justice Kennedy's concur-
ring opinion, he noted the great weight which a showing of remorse may
carry with a jury at the sentencing phase of a capital case.18 Clearly, the
forced administration of anti-psychotic drugs may interfere with the
defendant's ability to show remorse, an important mitigating factor. The
Court implied that the Eighth Amendment issue in this context is an open
15 470 U.S. 68 (1985). To obtain a state appointed expert underAke,
defense counsel must show that insanity will be a major factor in the
defense, that an expert is truly necessary, and that refusing to appoint an
expert will deny defendant a fair trial.
16 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(A) (1990). Under Virginia's
mental mitigation expert statute, an indigent capital defendant is auto-
matically provided with a mental health expert if he is charged with or
convicted of capital murder. The statute requires all state appointed
mental health experts to submit a detailed written report to defense
counsel on possible mitigating factors in the defendant's case. Va. Code
Ann. §19.2-264.3:1(C) (1990). More generally, defense experts act as
question, and therefore it is an argument defense counsel should pursue.
As with all federal constitutional arguments, defense counsel must be
sure to continuously raise the objection to preserve this issue for appeal.
Defense attorneys in Virginia may find the decision in Riggins
helpful in several respects. First of all, the Court confirms that a pretrial
detainee generally retains a liberty interest to avoid the forced adminis-
tration of drugs. Although the Court did not adopt a standard of strict
scrutiny, the state still must make a substantial showing that invasion of
the defendant's liberty interest is justified. Second, the opinion under-
scores the importance of skillful use of experts and investigators, who
may aid in rebutting the state's claim that it has met the Harper
prerequisites. Finally, nothing in the language of the opinion detracts
from the potentially potent due process and Eighth Amendment argu-
ments that forced administration of drugs impermissibly interferes with
a defendant's rights to a fair trial and a fair capital penalty hearing.
Although Riggins does not break new ground in the area of competency
law or substantive due process, it does reaffirm that pretrial detainees and
inmates retain a liberty interest, and leaves the door open for an extension
of those rights.
Summary and Analysis by:
Paul M. O'Grady
consultants for the defense and can aid greatly in building a theory of
mitigation.
17 See generally Konrad, Getting the Most and Giving the Least
fi'om Virginia's "Mental Health Mitigation" Statute, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 2 2 (1991); and Murtaugh, Mitigation: The Use
ofa Mental Health Expert in Capital Trials, Capital Defense Digest, Vol.
1, No. 2, p. 16 (1989).
18 Riggins, 112 S.Ct. at 1819-1820 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(citing Geimer& Amsterdam, Why Jurors VoteLife orDeath: Operative
Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 Am.J.Crim.L 1, 51-53
(1987-1988)).
MEDINA v. CALIFORNIA
112 S.Ct. 2572 (1992)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
In 1984 Teofila Medina, Jr. stole a gun from a Santa Ana pawn shop
and in the following weeks held up two gas stations, a drive-in dairy, and
a market. He killed three employees of these businesses, attempted to rob
a fourth employee, and shot at two passersby who attempted to follow
him. Medina was arrested a few weeks after he stole the gun and was
charged with a number of offenses, including three counts of first degree
murder.
Before his trial, Medina's counsel moved for a hearing to determine
if Medina was competent to stand trial.t Under California state law, "[a]
person cannot be tried or adjudged to punishment while such person is
mentally incompetent. ' 2 A defendant is mentally incompetent "if, as a
result of mental disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is
unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist
counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner."3 Under the
1 Medina's hearing was conducted pursuant to Cal. Penal Code
Ann. § 1368 (West 1982).
2 Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 1367 (West 1982).
3 Id.
California statute, there is a presumption that the defendant is competent,
and the burden of proving that the defendant is incompetent by a
preponderance of the evidence falls to the party claiming incompetence.
4
The court granted Medina's motion, and the competency issue was
tried before a jury. The hearing lasted six days and included conflicting
testimony from a number of experts.5 One psychiatrist, who had known
Medina while he was a prisoner in Arizona, testified that the defendant
was a paranoid schizophrenic and was incompetent to assist his counsel
at trial. A clinical psychologist doubted the diagnosis of schizophrenia
but expressed no opinion on competency. A different psychiatrist also
doubted the schizophrenia diagnosis but leaned toward competency.
Another psychologist found Medina schizophrenic but competent. Ajail
psychiatrist found that Medina suffered from depression, but that he was
competent and may have been malingering. A physician who treated
Medina could give no opinion as to competence. On a number of
occasions during the hearing, Medina made both verbal and physical
4 Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 1369 (West 1982). 4!
5 The opinion does not reveal whether the experts testified on
behalf of the defendant or the State.
